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Abstract
Future events are uncertain by their very nature. Therefore, people’s risk pref-
erences are likely to play a role in the valuation of allegedly guaranteed future
outcomes. We show that future uncertainty conjointly with people’s proneness to
nonlinear probability weighting generates a unifying framework for explaining many
anomalies in intertemporal choice, such as hyperbolic discounting and subadditiv-
ity of discount factors. Moreover, our approach implies that higher uncertainty
of future prospects increases the hyperbolicity of discount rates, suggesting that
institutional deficiencies such as lack of contract enforcement, may be a source of
hyperbolic discounting behavior. Based on an experiment with monetary incentives,
we show that people’s risk taking behavior is indeed a significant determinant of
their time discounting behavior: Greater departures from linear probability weight-
ing predict a stronger decline in impatience on the level of individual behavior.
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“Future income is always subject to some uncertainty, and this uncertainty must naturally
have an influence on the rate of time preference, or degree of impatience, of its possessor.”
Fisher (1930)
1 Introduction
Every day of our lives we take decisions, some with immediate consequences, some others
with consequences in the distant future. While immediate consequences, depending on
the nature of the decision, may be certain or uncertain, delayed ones are bound to be
uncertain even when they are allegedly guaranteed: For instance, a promised reward may,
due to unforeseen circumstances, materialize later or turn out to be smaller than expected,
or sudden illness or death may keep the decision maker from collecting her reward. For
these reasons, future consequences are inextricably associated with uncertainty, implying
that the decision maker’s valuation of temporal prospects not only depends on her pure
time preference, i.e. her preference for immediate utility over delayed utility, but also on
her perception of uncertainty and, consequently, on her risk preferences. In other words,
uncertainty drives a wedge between pure time preferences and time discounting.
If this account is an accurate description of intertemporal choice it has far reaching
implications for observed discounting behavior, the most obvious one being that behav-
iorally revealed discount rates will be higher than the rate of pure time preference as
they include a risk premium. Not surprisingly then, uncertainty has been identified to
be an important confound in the measurement of time preferences, which may, at least
partly, explain the notoriously high discount rates found in empirical studies (Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002). Recent research has not focused on the magni-
tude of observed discount rates, however, but rather on their hyperbolicity: Frequently,
people’s preference for present consumption seems to be so strong that their impatience
declines rapidly when the good in question is not available immediately, but at some
more remote future time (Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989; Ainslie,
1992; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996).1 Apparently, such a behavior is not
consistent with exponential discounting.
1Consequently, a large number of models of decreasing impatience, commonly labeled “hyperbolic”
or “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting, have been developed and applied to such diverse fields as saving
behavior, procrastination, addiction, retirement decisions, and global warming (Loewenstein and Prelec,
1992; Laibson, 1997, 1998; Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, Hall, Gale, and Akerlof, 1998; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, and Wit, 1999; Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman,
2001; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Karp, 2005).
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In this paper we show, and provide experimental support for our claim, that uncer-
tainty affects not only the level of discount rates but also their decline if people’s risk
preferences are adequately accounted for. We derive our results by referring to a fre-
quently observed characteristic of risk taking behavior: Often people’s preference for a
smaller more probable outcome over a larger less probable one changes in favor of the
larger outcome when both outcome probabilities are scaled down by a common factor
(Starmer and Sugden, 1989). A prominent example of this regularity is the Allais para-
dox. Such behavior can be suitably captured by decision models that incorporate a
nonlinear probability weighting function exhibiting subproportionality. Subproportional-
ity means that for a fixed ratio of probabilities the ratio of the corresponding probability
weights is closer to unity when the probabilities are low than when they are high (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). Intuitively speaking, scaling down the original probabilities
makes them less distinguishable from each other and, therefore, the larger outcome tends
to become more salient to the decision maker. That nonlinear probability weighting is the
rule and not the exception has recently been shown by a finite mixture regression study
which classifies individual decision makers according to their observed risk taking behav-
ior: Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2008) find that, in three different data sets, 80%
of the subjects exhibit substantial departures from linear probability weighting, whereas
only 20% are not prone to such behavior.
We show that subproportionality in conjunction with intrinsic uncertainty directly
generates hyperbolicity of discounting behavior. Furthermore, we link the extent of de-
creasing impatience to the degree of subproportionality: The more substantially a decision
maker’s probability weighting curve departs from linearity, the more strongly will impa-
tience decline over time, ceteris paribus, i.e. the more pronouncedly nonexponential will
be her discounting pattern.
The crucial question then remains whether probability weighting indeed predicts time
discounting behavior. That risk taking and discounting behavior exhibit a number of
parallels has already been noted by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), but so far no em-
pirical evidence has been presented that a link between probability weighting and time
discounting actually exists on the level of individual behavior, a sine qua non for our
model.
In order to supply empirical support for our hypothesis we conducted an experiment
with salient real monetary incentives, which exhibits a number of distinguishing fea-
tures: First, we generated data rich enough to be able to estimate individual probability
weighting functions and relate them to the same subjects’ discount rates. Second, since
the essential assumption of our approach is that decision makers perceive future outcomes
as uncertain even when these are allegedly guaranteed, a stringent test of the theory re-
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quires that promised rewards indeed appear guaranteed. For that purpose, in contrast
to many previous discounting experiments, every single subject was paid in an incentive
compatible manner. Furthermore, subjects received official vouchers of the Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Technology, an institution with an impeccable reputation, which entitled
them to collect their delayed payoffs at the university cashier’s desk. Third, we kept
transaction costs equal across different payment dates in order to preclude confounding
effects. Finally, we controlled for concave outcome utility.
We present the following results. First, we show that the degree of subjects’ sub-
proportionality of probability weights is a highly significant determinant of the strength
of decreasing impatience, as predicted by our framework. The curvature of the utility
function, however, seems not to be directly related to the decline of impatience. Sec-
ond, estimation results are robust to controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, such
as gender, age, experience with investment decisions and cognitive abilities. In fact, the
only variable predicting decreasing impatience turns out to be the degree of nonlinear-
ity of probability weights, which explains a, by any standard, large percentage of the
variation in the extent of the decline. Moreover, all our results are insensitive to model
specification.
Furthermore, we show that, aside from hyperbolic discounting, the uncertainty-cum-
probability-weighting approach provides a unifying framework for explaining a number
of other puzzling empirical findings as well. First, losses have been consistently found
to get discounted less heavily than gains, usually referred to as gain-loss asymmetry or
sign effect. Second, there is evidence of diminishing immediacy, i.e. people’s preference
for present outcomes weakens drastically when the present becomes risky: Whereas the
majority of subjects prefer a smaller immediate reward to a larger delayed one, merely a
minority do so when both rewards materialize just with a certain probability (Keren and
Roelofsma, 1995). Third, risk tolerance seems to be delay dependent as people are more
risk tolerant for lotteries played out in the more remote future than for otherwise iden-
tical lotteries resolved in the more immediate future (Noussair and Wu, 2006). Fourth,
Read (2001) presents evidence that observed discounting behavior is subadditive, mean-
ing that discounting over a delay is greater when the delay is divided into subintervals
than when it is left undivided. Finally, our model provides a theoretical underpinning of
empirical evidence that subjective probabilities attached to temporal prospects decline
hyperbolically with the delay of the prospect (Takahashi, Ikeda, Hasegawa, and Greene,
2007).
Our experimental findings strongly support the hypothesis that intrinsic uncertainty
is an important factor in generating hyperbolic discounting patterns, even if pure time
preferences are exponential. In addition, we show theoretically that an increase in the un-
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certainty of future prospects will increase the hyperbolicity of discount rates. This feature
of our approach is important because it implies that hyperbolic discounting is not merely
a property of people’s risk and time preferences, but may also be affected by institutional
characteristics that influence the uncertainty of future prospects. For example, if protec-
tion of property rights and institutions of contract enforcement are weak, future prospects
are likely to be highly uncertain. In such an environment decision makers that are prone
to probability distortions will exhibit a much higher degree of hyperbolic discounting
compared to an environment in which the legal system reliably enforces contracts and
protects property rights. This link between the institutional sources of uncertainty and
discounting behavior may explain why measured discount rates in developing countries,
which are often characterized by highly imperfect contract enforcement institutions, ex-
hibit a dramatically more pronounced hyperbolicity than in Western countries (Poulos
and Whittington, 2000; Anderson, Dietz, Gordon, and Klawitter, 2004).
Our contribution is related to recent theoretical work by Halevy (2008) who shows
that diminishing impatience may be a consequence of nonlinear probability weighting.
However, we demonstrate that nonlinear probability weighting in combination with in-
trinsic uncertainty not only implies hyperbolic discounting but also provides a unifying
framework for explaining many other observed anomalies of intertemporal choice. In
addition, we present the first evidence that people with more pronounced proneness to
probability weighting indeed exhibit more strongly declining impatience. Finally, we show
that hyperbolic discounting is not merely a property of individual preferences but may
also be generated by the institutional environment.
While uncertainty may be an important channel through which hyperbolicity of dis-
count rates is generated there may be other sources of hyperbolic discounting behavior
as well. For instance, pure time preferences may be hyperbolic per se, which is particu-
larly plausible in the context of addictive behavior. And when visceral motives, such as
hunger or lust, come into play, uncertainty may not be the dominant dimension decision
makers are concerned about. An excessive preference for the present may then be driven
by factors other than potential disappearance of the object of desire.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates our central
hypothesis on the role of risk preferences in time discounting. In Section 3 we describe
the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 outlines our approach to estimation.
Section 5 presents our results, discussed in detail in Section 6.
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2 Framework
In the following section we argue that subproportionality of probability weights is suffi-
cient for hyperbolicity of discounting behavior if the future is perceived as uncertain. We
present the formal derivation of this result, which holds for any subproportional proba-
bility weighting function, as well as all the other formal proofs in Appendix A. In Section
2.1, we derive comparative static effects using, for simplicity, a specific functional form of
the probability weighting curve. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of subpropor-
tionality for important empirical regularities in time discounting behavior in Section 2.2
and demonstrate the effects of increasing uncertainty on short-term impatience in Section
2.3.
In order to derive the presumed link between risk preferences and time discounting we
need to specify several ingredients of our approach: First, in order to show that intrinsic
uncertainty generates hyperbolicity of discounting behavior, even if pure time preferences
are exponential, we assume that pure time preferences are characterized by a constant
per-period rate r ≥ 0. Second, we model intrinsic uncertainty in the following way:
Any allegedly guaranteed future payment is perceived to materialize with a constant per-
period probability of contract survival s, 0 < s ≤ 1, which in turn gets transformed into
a subjective probability weight by the decision maker’s probability weighting function w
satisfying w′ > 0, w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1. We assume the probability weighting function to
be subproportional. Subproportionality means that for a fixed ratio of probabilities the
ratio of the corresponding probability weights is closer to unity when the probabilities
are low than when they are high. Expressed formally (Prelec, 1998), subproportionality
holds if 1 ≥ p > q > 0 and 0 < λ < 1 implies the inequality
w(p)
w(q)
>
w(λp)
w(λq)
. (1)
According to our framework, a decision maker evaluates a (certain) payment yt delayed
by t as a simple risky prospect (yt, s
t) that pays out yt with probability s
t and zero
otherwise. This implies that the present equivalent y0 of the future payment yt, such that
the decision maker is indifferent between y0 and yt, is defined by
v(y0) = v(yt)ρ
tw(st), (2)
where v denotes the decision maker’s valuation of monetary outcomes y and ρ is defined
as exp(−r). The discount factor D(t) at delay t equals the weight attached to v(yt), i.e.
D(t) = ρtw(st), (3)
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which depends not only on the pure rate of time preference r, but also on the probability of
contract survival s as well as on the shape of the probability weighting function w. Clearly,
if w is linear, D(t) declines exponentially irrespective of the magnitude of s. If 0 < s < 1,
the resulting discount factors are lower than for s = 1, implying that uncertainty per se
increases the absolute level of impatience, but cannot account for impatience declining
over time. If, however, w is nonlinear and 0 < s < 1, the component w(st) distorts
the discount factor: As we show in Appendix A, subproportionality of w is sufficient for
generating hyperbolicity of w(st) and, consequently, decreasing impatience if the future
is perceived as uncertain.
2.1 Subproportionality and Hyperbolicity
For simplicity, we discuss the effects of probability weighting on D(t) with an exemplary
illustration. We assume a specific functional form for the probability weighting curve,
consistent with the empirical literature, and vary the degree of its nonlinearity.
As we rely on subproportionality as the crucial characteristic of the probability weight-
ing function, we adopt the parameterization suggested by Prelec (1998),
w(p) = exp{−(− ln p)α}, 0 < α < 1. (4)
This function is subproportional everywhere and, additionally, inverse S-shaped, which is
in accordance with abundant empirical evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez
and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper, 2007). It conveniently
captures the degree of departure from linearity by its single parameter α: A smaller value
of α implies a more subproportional and more S-shaped probability weighting curve. For
values of α within the interval (0, 1) the curve intersects the identity line from above at
p = 1/e, implying overweighting of survival probabilities for st < 1/e and underweighting
for st > 1/e, respectively. Panel A1 of Figure I graphs this specification of the probability
weighting function for three distinct parameter values of α: a medium-sized departure
from linearity (α = 0.5), a strong departure from linearity (α = 0.2), as well as the
limiting case of linear probability weighting (α = 1).2 The dashed curve corresponding
to α = 0.2 is more strongly S-shaped and comparatively more subproportional than the
dotted curve for α = 0.5.
Panel B1 of Figure I depicts, for each of the three cases of probability weighting,
the discount factors resulting from Equation 3 as they evolve over time. For a decision
maker with linear probability weighting the discount function, represented by the solid
2For illustrative purposes, in Figure I r is fixed at 0.1 and s is assumed to be 0.8, which means that
80% of all contracts are anticipated to survive at least one period.
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Figure I: Comparative Statics: Varying α and s
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gray curve, is exponential. In contrast, the dotted discount function of a typical decision
maker with α = 0.5 departs from exponentiality, exhibiting an apparently hyperbolic
pattern consistent with numerous empirical findings (e.g. Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross
(1991); Kirby and Marakovic´ (1995); Myerson and Green (1995); Kirby (1997)). By
comparison, the decision maker characterized by the more strongly S-shaped probability
weighting curve underweights (overweights) large (small) probabilities more strongly than
does the decision maker with α = 0.5, which leads to an even more pronounced departure
from exponential discounting (dashed curve). This relationship constitutes our central
hypothesis which we will test empirically.
Finally, Panel C1 of Figure I displays the imputed discount rates d(t) inferred from
D(t) = exp(−d(t)t). The solid gray line corresponds to linear probability weighting. Since
this decision maker is not prone to probability distortions, her discount rate is independent
of time delay and, consequently, constant over time. In contrast to this decision maker,
the discount rates of the decision makers with nonlinear probability weights start out at
very high levels and then decline sharply. As is evident from comparing the dashed curve
with the dotted one, the more subproportional probability weighting function generates
a larger decline in discount rates between period 2 and period 1, i.e. the difference
d(2)−d(1) is greater for higher degrees of nonlinearity, measured by α, supplying us with
an operational hypothesis to be tested.
2.2 Subproportionality and Anomalies in Time Discounting
Interpreting future outcomes as inherently uncertain generates not only a link between
decreasing impatience and nonlinear probability weighting, but also provides a unifying
framework for explaining other qualitative patterns of observed discounting behavior, of-
ten termed anomalies as they are, prima vista, in conflict with the assumptions of the
standard model of intertemporal choice. Our explanation rests exclusively on subpropor-
tionality of probability weighting in combination with intrinsic uncertainty and does not
require any further assumptions.
In particular, one robust empirical finding concerns the gain-loss asymmetry in time
discounting: Losses have been persistently found to get discounted less heavily than
gains when moved into the future (Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989;
Chapman, 1996). In order to solve this puzzle we resort to the experimental evidence in
the domain of risk taking behavior: Estimated probability weighting curves for losses tend
to be significantly more elevated than the curves for gains, implying that, for each level
of probability, probability weights for losses are larger than for gains (e.g. Abdellaoui
(2000)). Consequently, the discount factor D(t) is higher for losses than for gains, as
can be inferred from Equation 3, entailing a lower devaluation of losses. Additionally,
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probability weights for losses tend to depart less strongly from linearity (Fehr-Duda,
de Gennaro, and Schubert, 2006), implying a comparatively lower degree of hyperbolicity
of the ensuing discount function, which seems to be in accord with the empirical evidence
reported in Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989).
Our framework also provides a rationale for evidence of diminishing immediacy when
risk comes into play (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995). Keren and Roelofsma find that the
percentage of subjects choosing an immediate smaller reward x over a delayed larger
reward y decreases significantly when the rewards are not certain but exposed to the
same level of probability of materializing, say p. Such behavior follows directly from
the subproportionality of the probability weighting function.3 In both types of decision
situations, (x, p) versus (y, pst) and (x, 1) versus (y, st), the ratios of the subjective prob-
abilities of the delayed and the immediate rewards are the same, namely 1/st. However,
the absolute probabilities in the ratio p/pst are lower than in 1/st, implying that the
ratio of probability weights attached to the former pair is closer to unity, i.e.
w(1)
w(st)
>
w(p)
w(pst)
(5)
holds for subproportional weights w. Hence,
v(x)w(1)
v(y)ρtw(st)
>
v(x)w(p)
v(y)ρtw(pst)
, (6)
implying that the difference in the subjective valuations of the immediate and the delayed
rewards shrinks when outcomes are made risky, which reduces the relative attractiveness
of the immediate reward x.
A similar argument can be applied to another puzzling phenomenon discovered by
Noussair and Wu (2006), delay dependence of risk tolerance. They report that subjects,
when choosing between relatively safe and risky gambles realized in the present as well
as three months into the future, are more risk tolerant for the future gambles. This effect
does not disappear when the gambles are played out in the near future rather than in the
present. According to our approach to time discounting, a change in relative risk tolerance
with respect to simple risky prospects is a direct consequence of subproportionality. To
see this, assume that the decision maker is faced with a choice between (x, p) versus (y, q)
with p > q and y > x. Subproportionality implies for t > 1,
w(p)
w(q)
>
w(ps)
w(qs)
>
w(pst)
w(qst)
(7)
3For an alternative explanation see Fudenberg and Levine (2009).
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and, therefore,
v(x)w(p)
v(y)w(q)
>
v(x)ρw(ps)
v(y)ρw(qs)
>
v(x)ρtw(pst)
v(y)ρtw(qst)
. (8)
By moving risky outcomes into the more remote future, the absolute levels of their sub-
jective probabilities decrease commensurately, without their ratio being changed. Due
to subproportionality, the corresponding probability weights become less and less dis-
tinguishable from each other as time passes, thereby reducing the difference in relative
valuations. Hence, a preference for the comparatively less risky gamble (x, p) gets weaker
over time.
Finally, accounting for uncertainty in the proposed way gives rise to subadditivity,
an additional feature of time discounting documented in the empirical literature (Read,
2001). Whereas decreasing impatience refers to a delay with respect to the present,
subadditivity pertains to period length, irrespective of where the period is located on
the timeline. Discounting behavior is subadditive when the product of the discount
factors resulting from a partition of a specific interval is smaller than the discount factor
applied to the interval at once. This characteristic of time discounting likewise follows
from subproportionality of probability weights: Suppose that (∆i)i=1,...,n is a partition
of delay D such that D =
∑n
i=1 ∆i. Since subproportionality implies w(p)w(q) < w(pq)
(see Equation 1), (w(p)w(q))w(z) < w(pq)w(z) < w(pqz) holds for any probabilities
0 < p, q, z < 1, and
n∏
i=1
w(s∆i) < w(
n∏
i=1
s∆i) = w(sD) (9)
follows by induction. Consequently, when partitioning a specific time interval, the product
of the corresponding weights of the survival probabilities
∏n
i=1 w(s
∆i) is smaller than the
weight attached to the probability of survival over the whole period w(
∏n
i=1 s
∆i) and,
hence, the product of the discount factors associated with the partition is smaller as well.
2.3 The Effects of Uncertainty on Hyperbolicity
Another important insight from our approach concerns the direct impact of uncertainty
on discounting behavior: Increasing uncertainty not only raises the level of discount rates
but also exacerbates short-term impatience. A formal proof is included in Appendix A.4.
Panels A2 to C2 in Figure I illustrate this effect for α = 0.5, a medium-sized departure
from linear probability weighting, and r = 0.1. When the survival probability s declines
from 0.8 to 0.5, the resulting discount function departs more strongly from exponentiality
as Panel B2 shows. Hence, the decrease in impatience associated with higher uncertainty
is more pronounced as well (Panel C2 ). In the numerical example here, the discount rate
of an exponential discounter would rise from 0.32 to 0.79, representing the well-known
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level effect of rising uncertainty (see Appendix A.1).
This analysis implies that hyperbolicity becomes more pronounced when intrinsic un-
certainty increases. This uncertainty may stem from different sources. At the personal
level, the survival probability s can be interpreted literally and, consequently, older or
ailing people are more likely to exhibit stronger short-run impatience than younger and
healthy ones ceteris paribus. Another important channel through which uncertainty may
influence individuals’ decisions is the institutional environment. In environments where
property rights are only weakly protected or institutions of contract enforcement are not
reliable, the probability of contract survival will be perceived to be rather low. Therefore,
our framework predicts that in countries with weak institutions, such as many develop-
ing countries, excessive short-run impatience should be prevalent, which seems to be
supported by empirical evidence (Poulos and Whittington, 2000).
If intrinsic uncertainty in conjunction with nonlinear probability weighting is such
a powerful concept for explaining anomalies in time discounting, the crucial question
remains whether risk taking behavior indeed predicts time discounting behavior at the
level of the individual decision maker. For this purpose, we conducted an experiment
with salient monetary incentives, described in detail in the next section.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment took place at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IERE),
University of Zurich, in May 2006. Participants were recruited from the IERE subject
pool, which consists of students from all fields offered at the University of Zurich and
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. In total, we analyzed 114 subject’s
responses.4 The experiment consisted of two main parts, one dedicated to eliciting cer-
tainty equivalents for risky prospects, the other one to eliciting future equivalents and
their corresponding imputed discount rates for temporal prospects.5
We used similar procedures to elicit certainty equivalents and discount rates, in order
to economize on subjects’ cognitive effort. For both types of tasks we implemented
choice menus containing a list of 20 varying alternatives which had to be judged against
a fixed option. To familiarize subjects with the nature of the procedure, the instructions
contained examples and trial problems. The experimenters checked the choices in the
4We omitted four subjects’ responses from our analysis, since these subjects reported that they would
not be able to cash in their delayed payments at the respective payment dates. Three of them would
have been on vacation then, the fourth person had planned a long visit abroad. Hence, their choices
were not informative of their time preferences.
5Instructions are available upon request. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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trial problems to verify that the subjects had comprehended the task. Besides a show up
fee of CHF 10 (CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.8 at the time of the experiment), each subject was paid
according to one of her risky choices and one of her temporal choices selected randomly
at the very end of the experiment. Subjects received their compensation for the risky
choices in cash immediately after completion of all the tasks. The compensation for their
intertemporal choices was paid out to them at the respective dates when they cashed in
vouchers issued to them at the end of the experiment. Payment modalities are described
in detail below. Subjects could work at their own speed. On average, it took them 1.25
hours to complete the experiment, including a socioeconomic questionnaire presented
after the choice tasks.
3.1 Elicitation of Certainty Equivalents
Since the objective of the risk task was generating observations on certainty equivalents,
on the basis of which individual probability weights could be estimated, a fairly large
number of observations per person was needed. To obtain individual lottery evaluations,
subjects were presented with 20 choice menus, each one involving a specific binary lottery
L = (x1, p;x2), with x1 > x2 ≥ 0, labelled Option A in Figure II. Option B in the choice
menu represented the guaranteed alternatives, ranging from the higher lottery outcome
x1 to the lower outcome x2. Every subject had to choose her preferred option in each row
of the choice menu. In Figure II, a hypothetical subject prefers all guaranteed payments
larger than CHF 36 to the stated lottery, and prefers the risky option in the remaining
rows. This subject’s valuation of the lottery, her certainty equivalent ce, is calculated
as the arithmetic mean of the two amounts next to her indifference point, amounting to
CHF 37 in the example here.
The set of lotteries, listed in Table I, included a wide range of outcomes and probabil-
ities. Every subject was confronted with this set of lotteries once. To avoid order effects,
the choice menus appeared in an individualized random order.
At the end of the experiment, after the subject had completed all the tasks, one row
of one choice menu was randomly selected for each payment. If the subject had opted
for the lottery there, her decision was played out for real. If the subject had opted for
the guaranteed payoff, the respective amount was paid out to her. On average, subjects
earned CHF 36.60 in cash for the risk task, including the show-up fee of CHF 10, to be
paid out immediately. Cash payments for the risk task were considerably higher than the
local student assistant’s hourly wage.
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Figure II: Choice Menu — Risk
Option A Your Choice
Option B
(guaranteed reward)
1
Gain
of CHF 50 with a 
probability of
75%
and
Gain
of CHF 10 with a 
probability of
25%
A B CHF 50
2 A B CHF 48
3 A B CHF 46
4 A B CHF 44
5 A B CHF 42
6 A B CHF 40
7 A B CHF 38
8 A B CHF 36
9 A B CHF 34
10 A B CHF 32
11 A B CHF 30
12 A B CHF 28
13 A B CHF 26
14 A B CHF 24
15 A B CHF 22
16 A B CHF 20
17 A B CHF 18
18 A B CHF 16
19 A B CHF 14
20 A B CHF 12
Table I: Risky Prospects
p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.1 20 10 0.25 50 20
0.5 20 10 0.5 50 20
0.9 20 10 0.75 50 20
0.05 40 10 0.95 50 20
0.25 40 10 0.05 150 50
0.5 40 10 0.5 10 0
0.75 40 10 0.5 20 0
0.95 40 10 0.05 40 0
0.05 50 20 0.95 50 0
0.1 150 0 0.25 40 0
Outcomes x1 and x2 are stated in CHF, p denotes the
probability of x1 materializing.
13
3.2 Elicitation of Discount Rates
The second task served to elicit individual discount rates. We elicited preferences in a
manner equivalent to the risk procedure for three temporal prospects, summarized in
Table II. The choice menus, designed as in Figure III, contained 20 binary choices each6.
Subjects had to choose between a certain earlier payment (at t0) and a certain later
payment (at t1). Specifically, Option A represented a fixed earlier amount of CHF 60,
and Option B offered 20 alternative amounts delayed by two months and four months,
respectively. The varying alternatives were sorted in descending order from the highest
amount to the lowest amount. The delayed amounts incorporated an interest payment
at a simple annualized rate of δ ∈ [0%, 95%] over the corresponding time interval [t0, t1].
These rates were exhibited in the right-most column of the choice menu. The principal
amount of CHF 60 and the range of interest rates were chosen to provide salient incentives,
so that deferring the reward was actually worthwhile. The arithmetic mean of the two
monetary amounts next to the indifference point on the choice menu provided the imputed
discount rate δt0t1 . For the hypothetical subject in Figure III, for instance, the future
equivalent amounts to CHF 70.50, implying a discount rate of 52.5% per annum.
Table II: Temporal Prospects
Amount Earlier payment at t0 Later payment at t1 Discount rate δt0t1
yt0 = 60 next day in 2 months + 1 day δ02
yt0 = 60 next day in 4 months + 1 day δ04
yt0 = 60 in 2 months + 1 day in 4 months + 1 day δ24
We applied a similar random payment method in the time task as in the risk task: One
of each subject’s choices was paid out for real at the corresponding payment date. Average
payoffs for the time task amounted to CHF 64.20. Therefore, total average payments for
both risk and time tasks summed to more than four times students’ opportunity costs,
measured by the student assistants’ hourly wages.
Since our objective was to elicit discount rates over certain payments, we took special
care with the payment procedure: First, every single subject got paid for one of her
intertemporal choices all of which entailed a payment of the same order of magnitude.
Not paying off everyone may render the stochastic nature of the experimental earnings
salient and interfere with the objective of eliciting discount rates over guaranteed amounts
of money.7 The second issue concerns the credibility of payment. In order to control
for uncertainty arising from subjects’ doubts about experimenter reliability, an official
6Coller and Williams (1999) propose a similar setup.
7It is reasonable to assume that subjects did not integrate the probability of a specific prospect
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Figure III: Choice Menu — Time
Option A
payment tomorrow
Your Choice
Option B
payment in 4 months + 1 day
1
Amount
of CHF 60
A B CHF 79 95%
2 A B CHF 78 90%
3 A B CHF 77 85%
4 A B CHF 76 80%
5 A B CHF 75 75%
6 A B CHF 74 70%
7 A B CHF 73 65%
8 A B CHF 72 60%
9 A B CHF 71 55%
10 A B CHF 70 50%
11 A B CHF 69 45%
12 A B CHF 68 40%
13 A B CHF 67 35%
14 A B CHF 66 30%
15 A B CHF 65 25%
16 A B CHF 64 20%
17 A B CHF 63 15%
18 A B CHF 62 10%
19 A B CHF 61 5%
20 A B CHF 60 0%
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voucher of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, an institution with highest
credit ratings, was issued to them. This payment method was explained in detail in
the instructions, and a specimen of the voucher was included in the instruction set.
This essentially rules out that subjects’ subjective uncertainty originated from potential
contract breach.
A third possibly confounding factor are transaction costs. Transaction costs should be
the same regardless of the payment date in order to avoid inducing present bias resulting
from immediately available cash payments. Therefore, even those subjects entitled to the
immediate amount of CHF 60 received a voucher and had to make a trip to the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology the next day.8
4 Econometric Specification
The data elicited in the experiment provide two types of main variables: certainty equiv-
alents ce for risky prospects, and imputed discount rates δt0t1 for temporal prospects.
We first discuss our econometric approach to risky choice and, subsequently, describe the
method employed to test our central hypothesis.
4.1 Behavior under Risk
Modeling decisions under risk encompasses two components, a model of behavior on the
one hand, and assumptions regarding decision errors on the other hand. Risk taking
behavior is modeled by a flexible functional in the spirit of prospect theory (PT).
According to PT, an individual values a two-outcome lottery L = (x1, p;x2), where
x1 > x2 ≥ 0, by
w(p)v(x1) + (1− w(p))v(x2). (10)
The function v(x), with v(0) = 0 and v′(x) > 0, describes how monetary outcomes x
are valued. The function w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability
p, with w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, and w′(p) > 0. The decision maker’s predicted certainty
equivalent cˆe for this lottery can then be written as
cˆe = v−1 [w(p)v(x1) + (1− w(p))v(x2)] . (11)
being chosen for payment, which equals 1/3 here, directly with their subjective probability of contract
survival (see Hey and Jinkwon (2005) for supporting evidence in the case of risk taking). If they did so,
however, by additionally discounting future utility by w(1/3), such that D(t) = ρtw(1/3)w(st), only the
magnitude of discount rates would have been affected and all of our results on decreasing impatience
still go through.
8All the sessions took place in the afternoon after the end of opening hours of the cashier’s desk.
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In order to make PT operational, we have to assume specific functional forms for the
value function v(x) and the probability weighting function w(p). A natural candidate for
v(x) is the power function
v(x) = xη, x ≥ 0, η > 0, (12)
which has turned out to be the best compromise between parsimony and goodness of fit
in the context of prospect theory (Stott, 2006).
A variety of functions for modeling probability weights w(p) have been proposed in the
literature (Karmarkar, 1979; Lattimore, Baker, and Witte, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Prelec, 1998). Since our primary interest lies in subproportionality, we focus on the
one-parameter specification proposed by Prelec (1998), as defined in Equation 4.
The functions’ single parameter α is equivalent to its slope at the inflection point.
Smaller values of α reflect a more subproportional and more S-shaped curve. Our main
hypothesis can now be expressed in terms of the weighting function parameter α: We
predict that α is negatively correlated with the size of the observed change in discount
rates, i.e. the greater the departure from linear probability weighting, the larger the
decline in discount rates.
With regard to error specification we have to reconsider our measurement procedure.
In the course of the experiment, an individual’s risk taking behavior was captured by her
certainty equivalents cel for a set of 20 different lotteries Ll = (x1l, pl;x2l), l ∈ {1, . . . , 20}.
Since PT explains deterministic choice, actual certainty equivalents cel are bound to
deviate from the predicted certainty equivalents cˆel by an error l, which has to be taken
account of. Therefore, we assume that the observed certainty equivalents cel can be
expressed as cel = cˆel + l. The Central Limit Theorem supports our assumption that
errors are normally distributed and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, we account for heteroskedasticity in the error variance: For each lottery
subjects had to consider 20 certain outcomes, equally spaced throughout the lottery’s
outcome range x1l − x2l. Since the observed certainty equivalent cel is calculated as
the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount preferred to the lottery and the
subsequent certain amount, the error is proportional to the outcome range. Therefore, the
standard deviation νl of the error term distribution has to be normalized by the outcome
range, yielding νl = ν(x1l−x2l), where ν denotes an additional parameter to be estimated.
In total, therefore, three parameters per subject were estimated by maximum likelihood:
the curvature of the value function η, the curvature of the probability weighting function
α, and the normalized standard deviation of the decision error ν.
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4.2 Behavior over Time
Subjects’ responses to the intertemporal choice tasks in the experiment provided us with
measurements of discount rates δ02 and δ04, imputed from the intertemporal tradeoffs
between present payments and payments delayed by two and four months, respectively.
However, our main hypothesis links the degree of departure from linear probability weight-
ing to the change in the utility equalizing discount rates. Clearly, these deviate from the
observed discount rates unless v is linear. While the curvature of the utility function
v cannot induce decreasing impatience by itself, it certainly does have a confounding
effect on the magnitude of the change in the measured discount rates ∆δ = δ02 − δ04:
In the presence of nonlinear probability weighting, ∆δ gets amplified by the concavity of
the utility function (see Appendix A.2). Specifically, the more concave v, the larger the
measured difference in the discount rates ∆δ if w(p) is not linear. Therefore, we have to
control for the degree of concavity η in the regression model.
4.3 Regression Model
We investigate the hypothesized relationship between decreasing impatience and proba-
bility weighting by regressing the difference between the imputed discount rates δ02 and
δ04, ∆δ, on a vector of regressors c. In the base model, Model 1, the vector c consists of a
constant and the individuals’ estimated risk preference parameters: η captures concavity
of the value function, α the curvature of the probability weighting function. Additionally,
we estimate an extended version of the base model, Model 2, by controlling for a set of
individual characteristics. In particular, these controls comprise gender (labeled Female),
age (Age), the logarithm of disposable income per month (Log-Income), a binary vari-
able indicating whether the subject is familiar with investment decisions (Experience) as
well as the test score for the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005). This
three-question test measures specific aspects of cognitive ability.9
Unlike the exemplary choice pattern displayed in Figure III, a decision maker may
have opted for the same option in all rows of the choice menu, which results in a censored
observation. In particular, she may have always preferred the smaller sooner option,
indicating that her discount rate may lie beyond the maximum value of 95%.10 As a
consequence, the difference between the observed discount rates δ02 and δ04 is affected by
censoring as well. As ordinary least square (OLS) yields biased estimates in this case, we
account for this issue by a censored regression model, described in detail in Appendix B.
9Summary statistics of the controls are included in Appendix E, Table A.1.
10A decision maker may also always prefer the later larger option. In this case, we assume a discount
rate of 0%. The number of observations at the boundary of the choice menu are listed in Table A.2 of
Appendix E.
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The model has the following form:
∆δ∗i = ci (β02 − β04)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆β
+ e02,i − e04,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ei
, (13)
where ∆δ∗i specifies the true, but potentially unobserved, difference between δ02 and δ04
for individual i, i ∈ {1, . . . , 114}. The error term ∆ei is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2. The interpretation of the regression coefficients ∆β is equivalent
to those of OLS regression, also displayed in the regression output (Table IV below).
5 Results
In the following section we analyze the raw data on risk taking behavior and time dis-
counting, and present the estimates for subjects’ probability weights. Finally, we examine
our central hypothesis on the relationship between subjects’ sensitivities with respect to
changes in probability and delay.
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
For the domain of risk taking, Figure IV summarizes observed behavior by the median
relative risk premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the expected value of a
lottery’s payoff and ce stands for the observed certainty equivalent. RRP > 0 indicates
risk aversion, RRP < 0 risk seeking, and RRP = 0 risk neutrality. The median relative
risk premia, sorted by the probability p of the higher gain, show a systematic relationship
between aggregated risk attitudes and lottery probabilities: Subjects’ choices display the
familiar pattern, i.e. they are risk averse for high-probability gains, but risk seeking for
low-probability gains, supporting our assumptions.
As far as intertemporal choices are concerned, people’s average behavior exhibits de-
creasing impatience, i.e. subjects discount less remote outcomes more strongly than more
remote ones: The first column in Table III reveals that the discount rates imputed from
subject’s choices decline on average by 7 percentage points per annum when the time
horizon is extended from two months to four months. The average data veil heterogene-
ity as well as the extent of decreasing impatience, however. Whereas the majority of
approximately 54% of all subjects exhibit decreasing discount rates over time, ∆δ > 0
(second column), about 29% exhibit constant discount rates (third column), and the
residual group reveals increasing discount rates (fourth column).11 Average discount
11This composition of discounting types resembles the one found in a representative field experiment
conducted with 500 adults from the German population (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2007).
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Figure IV: Median Relative Risk Premia (RRP)
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rates for those subjects that exhibit decreasing impatience amount to δ02 = 46% p.a. and
δ04 = 30% p.a., respectively, reflecting a greater change than do the overall averages. For
the group with constant impatience, ∆δ = 0, the average discount rate amounts to 21%,
which is significantly lower than the overall average (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p-value
< 0.002).12
Table III: Average Discount Rates and Risk Parameters
Subjects with
all ∆δ > 0 ∆δ = 0 ∆δ < 0
100% 54.4% 28.9% 16.7%
δ02 0.366 0.459 0.328
(0.025) (0.022) 0.213 (0.024)
δ04 0.296 0.302 (0.024) 0.418
(0.023) (0.019) (0.028)
∆δ 0.070 0.157 0 -0.090
(0.014) (0.011) (0.008)
α 0.499 0.424 0.565 0.633
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
η 1.022 1.018 0.989 1.090
(0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.025)
Standard errors in parentheses. Excluding 24 subjects
with censored observations (n = 90).
Furthermore, average observed behavior also exhibits subadditivity of discount rates,
12The distributions of the observed discount rates are shown in Appendix C.
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consistent with our theoretical framework. For the 87 subjects with three non-censored
observations, the discount factor over the whole period of four months equals 0.917 and,
thus is considerably higher than the product of the discount factors over the respective
two-month subperiods amounting to 0.905 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value < 0.0003).
5.2 Risk Preference Parameters
Whereas one of our central variables, changing impatience ∆δ, is directly observable, the
other one, departure from linear probability weighting, has to be estimated from our data
on certainty equivalents.
Individual risk preference parameters η and α were estimated on the basis of the
econometric model discussed in Section 4.1. As Table III reveals, the value of the cur-
vature parameter η of the utility function, 1.022, is not distinguishable from unity on
average, with little variation across discounting types. The average subproportionality
index α amounts to 0.499, indicating a pronounced departure from linear probability
weighting in line with previous findings (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and
Wu, 1999; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper, 2007).13
The overall picture revealed by our data is consistent with the typical empirical find-
ings: On average, subjects systematically violate linear probability weighting and con-
stant discounting. But the central question, namely whether the extent of the departure
from linear probability weighting empirically predicts the degree of hyperbolicity of dis-
counting behavior has yet to be answered.
5.3 Probability Weighting and Decreasing Impatience
With the estimates of people’s probability weighting parameters and their observed dis-
count rates we are now equipped to examine our central hypothesis, namely whether
nonlinear probability weighting predicts decreasing impatience at the level of individual
behavior. A first indication that our conjecture bears out can be found in Table III.
The average estimated subproportionality index α varies substantially across discount-
ing types and exhibits a systematic pattern: α is lowest for the group with decreasing
impatience and highest for the group with increasing impatience.
This finding is confirmed by the estimates of the regression models. Table IV displays
the results derived by OLS as well as by the censored regression method. Inspection of
the coefficients indicates that censoring seems not to be an important problem: When
omitting the 24 censored observations, OLS yields coefficients very close to the estimates
of the censored regression model. Furthermore, both specifications (Models 1 and 2)
13Histograms of the parameter distributions are included in Appendix D.
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lead to the same conclusion: Consistent with our central hypothesis, the curvature of
the probability weighting function is a significant determinant of decreasing impatience.
Table IV shows the estimated coefficient of α to be approximately −0.2, which remains
robust to inclusion of additional controls. All the respective estimates are significant at
the 1%-level. The effect is not only highly significant, it is also quite substantial: A
decrease in the subproportionality index α by 0.1 is associated with an increase in ∆δ by
2 percentage points per annum.
Table IV: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: ∆δ (∆δ∗)
OLSa Censored
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.105 0.153 0.091 0.132
(0.056) (0.221) (0.053) (0.208)
η 0.065 0.053 0.073 0.060
(0.042) (0.045) (0.040) (0.044)
α -0.202∗∗ -0.221∗∗ -0.176∗∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.067) (0.074) (0.062) (0.074)
Female -0.013 -0.012
(0.030) (0.031)
Age -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.007)
Log-Income -0.010 -0.007
(0.023) (0.022)
Experience 0.016 0.018
(0.031) (0.030)
CRT 0.023 0.022
(0.017) (0.016)
σˆ 0.121 0.122 0.083 0.083
R2 or (LogLik) 0.142 0.177 (46.635) (49.276)
Observations 90 90 114 114
Parameters 3 8 7 17
a) without censored observations. ∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parentheses (10,000 replications). Boot-
strapping accounts for the fact that the regressors. α and η are
estimated quantities.
The coefficients of the curvature parameter η, however, are not statistically different
from zero. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that utility curvature per se
does not impact the extent of decreasing impatience. Furthermore, none of the other
individual characteristics show a significant effect.
A likelihood ratio test of the censored Model 2 against Model 1 renders a p-value
of 0.954, favoring the more parsimonious Model 1, as the controls do not substantially
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contribute to explaining the variance in ∆δ∗. Furthermore, the regression models explain
a rather large fraction of total variance: Model 1 estimated by OLS, for instance, yields
an R-squared value of 14.2%.14 These findings present conclusive evidence that compar-
atively more subproportional probability weighting is associated with a stronger decline
in discount rates.
5.4 Perceived Uncertainty and the Pure Rate of Time Prefer-
ence
In sum, our analysis provides support for the hypothesized relationship between proba-
bility weighting and decreasing impatience. Our framework predicts such a relationship
ceteris paribus, holding constant the other model parameters, specifically the subjective
probability of contract survival s and the pure rate of time preference r, both of which are
not observable. In our experimental setting with decisions over a short time horizon, the
subjective probability of contract survival st should lie very close to unity since mortality
risk is very low in our age group of subjects and we took great care to communicate ex-
perimenter reliability. One way of checking the plausibility of our model is to investigate
whether actual choices are indeed consistent with this conjecture, i.e. whether values of
s implied by our data lie in the vicinity of one for a wide range of plausible values of the
pure rate of time preference r.
For this purpose, we examine the combinations of s and r that are consistent with the
observed intertemporal tradeoffs between more immediate and more remote payments yt0
and yt1 . We solve for all feasible combinations of s˜ and t˜ that are compatible with the
observed choices by inserting the estimates for subjects’ average behavioral parameters
η and α into Equation 2. As is clear from Equation 2, a higher probability of contract
survival needs to be compensated by a higher pure rate of time preference, ceteris paribus,
to keep individuals indifferent between more immediate and more remote rewards.
As Figure V shows, the feasible (s˜, r˜)-combinations indeed exhibit a rising profile,
with s˜ starting out at slightly below 96% p.a. and converging to 100%, when the pure
rate of time preference increases from 0% to 20% p.a. and beyond. What this exercise
shows is that the data, interpreted within our framework, are consistent with a very high
subjective probability that contracts survive at least one year, in accordance with our
assumptions. Furthermore, accounting for inherent uncertainty implies rates of pure time
preference in a plausible range lying considerably below the respective range of observed
discount rates.
14Moreover, it can be shown that estimates are robust to an alternative specification of the probability
weighting curve (see Appendix F) as well as to restricting observations to subsamples.
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Figure V: Feasible (s˜, r˜)-Combinations
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This suggests that even allegedly guaranteed future outcomes are viewed as slightly
uncertain, in line with direct questionnaire evidence provided in Patak and Reynolds
(2007). The authors asked respondents to rate their certainties for the same rewards, de-
layed by 1, 2, 30, 180, and 365 days, respectively, which they had encountered during the
preceding choice experiment. The respondents reported ratings that clearly declined with
the length of delay. Moreover, using a similar method, Takahashi, Ikeda, Hasegawa, and
Greene (2007) found that such subjective probabilities of obtaining delayed rewards de-
cay in a hyperbolic-like manner, consistent with the hyperbolic decline of subproportional
probability weights w(st).
6 Discussion
It has long been recognized that uncertainty is an important dimension of choices over
time. While we cannot claim credit for this longstanding idea, which goes back at least
to Fisher (1930), we provide novel insights into the relationship between risk taking and
time discounting behavior. We show that risk preferences may not only play a role in de-
termining the magnitude of the discount rate, as many economists have asserted, but also
in generating decreasing impatience. Specifically, our results suggest that people’s prone-
ness to nonlinear probability weighting is an important source of hyperbolic discounting
patterns.
Our experimental findings provide support for the existence of such a link between
probability weighting and time discounting. In particular, we present the first evidence
that more pronounced systematic departures from linear probability weighting indeed
24
predict more strongly declining impatience. This result is robust to inclusion of additional
controls, econometric approach as well as model specification. In fact, the only variable
explaining a substantial fraction of heterogeneity in individual discounting patterns turns
out to be the degree of nonlinearity of probability weights.
Furthermore, our approach provides a powerful unifying framework for explaining
previous puzzling findings in intertemporal choice. It provides a deeper understanding of
why immediacy diminishes when risk comes into play. When explicitly manipulating the
level of risk, Keren and Roelofsma (1995) found that subjects’ preference for a smaller
immediate payment dwindled drastically when both immediate and delayed options were
made risky. This finding led them to tentatively conclude that immediacy is likely to be
a derivative of certainty, an intuition that we incorporate into our approach in a princi-
pled way. Furthermore, intrinsic uncertainty in conjunction with nonlinear probability
weighting offers an explanation for the sign effect, the delay dependence of risk tolerance
as well as the observed subadditivity of discount rates. It also provides a rationale for
the finding that subjective ratings of the probability of receiving a future reward decline
hyperbolically with the length of delay.
If probability weighting plays such an important role in discounting behavior, the
obvious question concerning the source of these probability distortions arises. A num-
ber of theoretical contributions invoke emotions to explain behavior (Wu, 1999; Caplin
and Leahy, 2001). Walther (2003, 2007), for instance, rationalizes nonlinear probability
weighting by generalizing expected utility theory: He assumes that, in addition to mon-
etary outcomes, the decision maker cares about emotions triggered by the resolution of
uncertainty. His approach predicts that, if the decision maker anticipates experiencing
elation or disappointment when the actual outcome lies above or below some normal
level, she will distort outcome probabilities according to an S-shaped pattern. The more
emotional a person expects to be, the stronger will be her departure from linear prob-
ability weighting and, consequently, the larger her decline of discount rate. Of course,
sensitivity to anticipated emotions is not easily observable, and we have to leave it to
future research to investigate whether anticipated emotions are the primary drivers of
probability weighting.
What are the implications of our results for economic policy? There has been a
long debate concerning people’s chronically low propensity to save, possible stemming
from hyperbolic discounting. Our analysis suggests that hyperbolicity is caused by peo-
ple’s subjective assessment of future uncertainty. Uncertainty may stem from different
sources, either tied to the individual herself, such as lifetime expectancy, or to environ-
mental factors. Lack of contract enforcement and weak property rights, for instance,
may make people skeptical that promises will be actually kept. Therefore, institutionally
25
generated uncertainties may induce extreme short-run impatience even if people’s pure
rate of time preference is constant. In accordance with this view, discounting patterns
in developing countries, the institutions of which are typically characterized by highly
imperfect contract enforcement and weak property rights, seem to depart much more
pronouncedly from exponentiality that in Western societies. Our approach suggest that
policy measures and regulations fostering well defined property rights, reliable institu-
tions of contract enforcement, trustworthy financial institutions, as well as general norms
of pacta sunt servanda help on reducing excessive short-run impatience as well as overall
high discount rates.
Aside from reducing uncertainty through institutional reforms, another channel to
affect people’s behavior could be their proneness to probability distortion. Unfortunately,
little is known about the forces driving probability weighting, but we speculate that,
aside from emotional factors, cognitive limitations as well as familiarity with the decision
domain may play a decisive role here. If this is the case, policy measures should include
education and information. All of these measures do not promise immediate success and,
therefore, require a long term view on the part of the policy makers.
While our analysis helps to gain a better understanding of one of the mechanisms
behind discounting behavior, this discussion makes clear that the reasons why people
apparently distort probabilities are still not well understood and should, therefore, become
an object of future research.
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A Theoretical Framework
In the following we derive hyperbolicity of discounting from our assumptions on intrinsic
uncertainty and nonlinear probability weighting. Furthermore, we show that the extent
of hyperbolicity is a consequence of the degree of subproportionality of the probability
weighting function. Finally, we demonstrate that higher uncertainty induces greater
hyperbolicity.
A.1 Hyperbolicity
In the framework proposed here, the discount factor D(t) equals
D(t) = ρtw(st), (A.1)
with ρ defined as exp(−r). The discount function D(t) is exponential if w(st) = st.
Obviously, in this case, uncertainty per se reduces the discount factor by st, and hence
increases the imputed per-period discount rate to d = r − ln(s) > r for 0 < s < 1,
but does not interfere with exponentiality of the discount function. If the probability of
contract survival is weighted nonlinearly, however, the discount function will depart from
exponentiality.
In order to establish the link between subproportional probability weighting and hy-
perbolicity, we define decreasing impatience at t in the following way (Prelec, 1989, 2004):
Let (x, t) be a temporal prospect paying off x at t with certainty. A preference relation
 exhibits decreasing impatience if for any t > 0, 0 < x < y, (x, u) ∼ (y, z) implies
(y, z + t)  (x, u+ t).
According to our framework the temporal prospects (x, 0) ∼ (y, 1) are evaluated as
v(x)ρ0w(s0) = v(y)ρ1w(s1). As subproportionality of w implies that w(s) < w(st+1)/w(st),
deferring the prospects by t periods renders
1 =
v(y)ρw(s)
v(x)
<
v(y)ρt+1w(st+1)
v(x)ρtw(st)
(A.2)
and, therefore, (y, t+ 1)  (x, t), meeting the requirement for decreasing impatience. 
In the intertemporal tradeoff between the present and the subsequent period the
discount factor equals ρw(s). At time t, v(x) is discounted by ρtw(st). Compounding by
the initial one-period discount factor ρw(s) would render ρt+1w(s)w(st) at t+ 1, but the
discount factor effectively amounts to ρt+1w(st+1) then. Therefore, w(st+1)/(w(s)w(st)),
the wedge between the relative discount factors D(0)/D(1) and D(t)/D(t+ 1), provides
a measure for the extent of departure from stationarity at t.
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A.2 Effect of Concavity
In the course of the experiment we cannot observe discount factors at delay t, D(t),
directly, however, but infer D˜(t) from the intertemporal tradeoffs between payments at
different dates, i.e. y0 = D˜(t)yt. According to our assumptions, utility is modeled by a
power function v(y) = yη, η > 0, which renders D˜(t) = D(t)
1
η . It follows that
D˜(0)/D˜(1)
D˜(t)/D˜(t+ 1)
=
(
D(0)/D(1)
D(t)/D(t+ 1)
) 1
η
(A.3)
and therefore observed decreasing impatience resulting from nonlinear probability weight-
ing gets amplified by η < 1 and, hence, concavity has to be controlled for in the regression
model.
A.3 Comparative Hyperbolicity
According to our framework, decreasing impatience can solely be rationalized by nonlin-
ear probability weighting. Consequently, a clear hypothesis results which can be tested
empirically: Decision makers prone to probability weighting may be also prone to de-
creasing impatience. As we show below, we can derive a more precise prediction: A
decision maker with a comparatively more subproportional probability weighting func-
tion will also tend to exhibit more decreasing impatience. This relationship provides the
basis for our empirical test.
A preference relation 2 exhibits more decreasing impatience than 1 if for any in-
tervals 0 ≤ u < z, t,∆t and outcomes 0 < x < y, 0 < x′ < y′, (x, u) ∼1 (y, z),
(x, u + t) ∼1 (y, z + t + ∆t), and (x′, u) ∼2 (y′, z) imply (x′, u + t) 2 (y′, z + t + ∆t)
(Prelec, 2004).
In order to examine the effect of the degree of subproportionality on hyperbolicity
suppose that the probability weighting function w2 is comparatively more subproportional
than w1, as defined in Prelec (1998), and that the following indifference relations hold for
two decision makers 1 and 2 at periods u = 0 and z = 1:
v1(x) = v1(y)ρw1(s) for 0 < x < y,
v2(x
′) = v2(y′)ρw2(s) for 0 < x′ < y′.
Due to subproportionality, in period t,
1 =
v1(y)ρw1(s)
v1(x)
<
v1(y)ρ
t+1w1(s
t+1)
v1(x)ρtw1(st)
(A.4)
Therefore, the subjective probability of contract survival has to be reduced by compound-
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ing s over an additional time period ∆t to re-establish indifference:
v1(x)ρ
tw1(s
t) = v1(y)ρ
t+1w1(s
t+1+∆t). (A.5)
It follows from the definition of comparative subproportionality that this adjustment of
the survival probability by ∆t is not sufficient to re-establish indifference with respect to
w2, i.e.
v2(x
′)ρtw2(st) < v2(y′)ρt+1w2(st+1+∆t). (A.6)
Therefore, (x′, t) ≺ (y′, t+ 1 + ∆t). 
29
A.4 Uncertainty and Hyperbolicity
In order to derive the effect of increasing uncertainty on hyperbolicity we examine the
sensitivity of the departure from stationarity at t, measured by w(st+1)/(w(s)w(st)), with
respect to changing s:
∂
∂s
[
w(st+1)
w(s)w(st)
]
= 1
[w(s)w(st)]2
[(1 + t)stw(s)w(st)w′(st+1)− tst−1w(s)w(st+1)w′(st)− w(st)w(st+1)w′(s)]
= 1
s[w(s)w(st)]2
[(1 + t)st+1w(s)w(st)w′(st+1)− tstw(s)w(st+1)w′(st)− sw(st)w(st+1)w′(s)]
= w(s
t+1)
sw(s)w(st)
[
(1+t)st+1w′(st+1)
w(st+1)
− tstw′(st)
w(st)
− sw′(s)
w(s)
]
= w(s
t+1)
sw(s)w(st)
[(1 + t)ε(st+1)− tε(st)− ε(s)] ,
< 0
with ε(p) = pw′(p)/w(p) defined as the elasticity of the probability weighting function w.
According to Lemma 4.1 in Segal (1987), subproportionality holds iff ε(p) is increasing.
As st+1 < st < s, ε(st+1) < ε(st) < ε(s) and, hence, the sum of the elasticities in the
final line of the derivation is negative. Therefore, increasing uncertainty, i.e. decreasing
s, entails a greater departure from stationarity and, consequently, a higher degree of
hyperbolicity. 
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B Censored Regression Model
This appendix discusses the way we model the difference in the censored observed discount
rates, ∆δ = δ02 − δ04, and link it to individual risk preferences.
To relate time discounting to risk preferences, the model assumes the following linear
relationship between the discount rate δ∗k,i of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} over delay k ∈
{two months, four months} and a vector of regressors ci, containing a constant, the
parameters of risk preferences, ηi and αi, as well as some socioeconomic characteristics:
δ∗k,i = ciβk + ek,i, (A.7)
where βk denotes a vector of slope parameters and ek,i stands for a normally distributed
error term with mean zero and variance 1
2
σ2. Under the assumption of nonnegative
discounting, the choice menu, depicted in Figure III, allows us to directly elicit individual
discount rates, which lie between 0% and 92.5%. However, if individual i always opts
for being paid out at the earlier point in time (Option A), we do not necessarily observe
her true discount rate δ∗k,i as we only know that it amounts to at least 95%. Thus, the
elicited discount rates, δ02,i and δ04,i, are censored from above at b = 0.95. In the data
we observe
δk,i =
{
δ∗k,i if δ
∗
k,i < b,
b otherwise.
(A.8)
This immediately yields the difference in the discount rates over two and four months,
∆δ∗i = ci (β02 − β04)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆β
+ e02,i − e04,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ei
, (A.9)
where ∆ei is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2. Consequently, this
difference ∆δ∗i is affected by censoring, too, and only observed if both δ02,i < b and
δ04,i < b.
In order to avoid biased estimators for β02, β04, and σ, the model needs to take
the censored nature of the data into account. Therefore, its log likelihood takes on the
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following form:
lnL (β02, β04, σ; c, δ02, δ04) =
∑
i: δ02,i=b, δ04,i=b
P (δ02,i = b, δ04,i = b | c, δ02, δ04) (A.10)
+
∑
i: δ02,i<b, δ04,i=b
P (δ02,i < b, δ04,i = b | c, δ02, δ04)
+
∑
i: δ02,i=b, δ04,i<b
P (δ02,i = b, δ04,i < b | c, δ02, δ04)
+
∑
i: δ02,i<b, δ04,i<b
1
σ
φ
(
∆δi − ci (β02 − β04)
σ
)
,
where φ represents the standard normal distribution’s density and the probabilities P ,
accounting for the different ways by which an observation may be censored, are given by
P (δ02,i = b, δ04,i = b | c, δ02, δ04) =
[
1− Φ
(
b− ciβ02
σ
)] [
1− Φ
(
b− ciβ04
σ
)]
,
P (δ02,i < b, δ04,i = b | c, δ02, δ04) = Φ
(
b− ciβ02
σ
) [
1− Φ
(
b− ciβ04
σ
)]
,
P (δ02,i = b, δ04,i < b | c, δ02, δ04) =
[
1− Φ
(
b− ciβ02
σ
)]
Φ
(
b− ciβ04
σ
)
,
with Φ denoting the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
Numerical maximization of lnL (β02, β04, σ; c, δ02, δ04) yields the maximum likelihood es-
timates of βˆ02, βˆ04, and σˆ. To obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of ∆βˆ we utilize
the invariance property.
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C Observed Discount Rates
Figure A.1: Discount Rates over 2 and 4 Months, δ02 and δ04
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Figure A.2: Change in Discount Rates ∆δ
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D Estimated Risk Parameters
Figure A.3: Distribution of η and α
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E Controls
Table A.1: Summary Statistics (n = 114)
Type Mean Std.Err.
Female binary 0.439 0.047
Age numeric 22.640 0.206
Log-Income numeric 6.388 0.066
Experience binary 0.307 0.043
CRT numeric 2.202 0.081
Table A.2: Number of Observations at the Bounds (n = 114)
δ02 δ04 δ24
≥ 95% 24 15 16
0% 2 0 3
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F Alternative Specification
Alternatively to Prelec’s specification of the probability weighting function we also esti-
mated the risk model based on Karmarkar’s proposal (Karmarkar, 1979):
w(p) =
pγ
pγ + (1− p)γ , 0 < γ. (A.11)
This function is inverted S-shaped for 0 < γ < 1, subproportional for medium and large
probabilities. It intersects the diagonal form above at p = 0.5. The parameter γ measures
departure from linear probability weighting. The larger is γ, the less strongly S-shaped
is the curve. As Table A.3 shows, the relationship between hyperbolic discounting and
nonlinear probability weighting is equally strong and significant as for Prelec’s specifica-
tion.
Table A.3: Karmarkar Specification
Dependent Variable: ∆δ (∆δ∗)
OLSa Censored
Intercept 0.161 0.147
(0.051) (0.047)
η 0.016 0.027
(0.051) (0.048)
γ -0.212∗∗ -0.186∗∗
(0.068) (0.062)
σˆ 0.123 0.085
R2 or (LogLik) 0.121 (45.029)
Observations 90 114
Parameters 3 7
a) without censored observations. ∗∗ significant
at the 1% level. Bootstrapped standard errors
in parentheses (10,000 replications). Bootstrap-
ping accounts for the fact that γ and η are
estimated quantities.
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